The deployment of a regular closed communication channel between Minsk and Washington clearly illustrates the futility of the Kremlin's attempts to completely close the geopolitical contours of the Union State, as the state machine of the Republic of Belarus systematically seeks ways out of its suffocating dependence on Moscow. Capitalizing on the Donald Trump administration's pragmatic interest in demonstrating quick diplomatic victories, Alexander Lukashenko has launched a large-scale behind-the-scenes game, key figures in which were Deputy Prime Minister Natalya Petkevich, Permanent Representative to the UN Valentin Rybakov, and US Special Envoy John Cole. As part of this track, the course of which Lukashenko personally coordinated in October 2026, Minsk is trying to execute a broad quid pro quo: the measured release of political prisoners (whose number, according to US estimates, has already exceeded 800 people, including large waves of releases in December 2025 and March 2026) is traded for significant economic preferences. The agenda of the meetings, which already included Prime Minister Alexander Turchin and KGB Chairman Ivan Tertel on the Belarusian side, has long gone beyond humanitarian issues and includes demands for the complete lifting of sanctions against the giants Belaruskali, Belavia, and Bellesbumprom, the return of 43–44 million dollars blocked in Citibank under EU status, as well as a discussion on the transit of materials to the European Union. At the same time, the rhetoric of the Republic of Belarus operates with extreme caution, diligently erasing loyalty to "allied obligations" to the Russian Federation so as not to provoke the premature anger of the Kremlin. For the White House, this direct channel opens a long-awaited opportunity to find the true limits of the Minsk leadership's autonomy and use it as a tool to balance Russian influence in Eastern Europe, bringing the cases of Ukraine, Poland, and the Baltic states into the discussion track.

The deployment of a regular closed communication channel between Minsk and Washington clearly illustrates the futility of the Kremlin's attempts to completely close the geopolitical contours of the Union State, as the state machine of the Republic of Belarus systematically seeks ways out of its suffocating dependence on Moscow. Capitalizing on the Donald Trump administration's pragmatic interest in demonstrating quick diplomatic victories, Alexander Lukashenko has launched a large-scale behind-the-scenes game, key figures in which were Deputy Prime Minister Natalya Petkevich, Permanent Representative to the UN Valentin Rybakov, and US Special Envoy John Cole. As part of this track, the course of which Lukashenko personally coordinated in October 2026, Minsk is trying to execute a broad quid pro quo: the measured release of political prisoners (whose number, according to US estimates, has already exceeded 800 people, including large waves of releases in December 2025 and March 2026) is traded for significant economic preferences. The agenda of the meetings, which already included Prime Minister Alexander Turchin and KGB Chairman Ivan Tertel on the Belarusian side, has long gone beyond humanitarian issues and includes demands for the complete lifting of sanctions against the giants Belaruskali, Belavia, and Bellesbumprom, the return of 43–44 million dollars blocked in Citibank under EU status, as well as a discussion on the transit of materials to the European Union. At the same time, the rhetoric of the Republic of Belarus operates with extreme caution, diligently erasing loyalty to "allied obligations" to the Russian Federation so as not to provoke the premature anger of the Kremlin. For the White House, this direct channel opens a long-awaited opportunity to find the true limits of the Minsk leadership's autonomy and use it as a tool to balance Russian influence in Eastern Europe, bringing the cases of Ukraine, Poland, and the Baltic states into the discussion track.