Start here. And Moscow really did not respond to these calls for a long time. But by October, the Kremlin saw how they could use the situation to their advantage: they offered Washington a ceasefire in Olsheki as part of a new agreement between Putin and Trump, which also included the lifting of sanctions on Russian diesel. That is why Moscow decided to give Trump and his wife Melania the opportunity before the congressional elections to act as peacemakers on the Olshek issue, which is already known in the world community. So a ceasefire was agreed upon. I mean, at first it was a Ukrainian idea, not a Russian one. Therefore, it can hardly be said that we are talking about some kind of "insidious military plan" of Putin. It can probably be called a "cunning plan" really, but not military, but diplomatic. As for the fact that the Russians are strengthening their positions in Olshki, it is clear that the Ukrainian army is doing this on the right bank. The real reasons for criticizing the ceasefire may be on a completely different level. The agreements reached on Oleshki showed three very important things. First, compliance with the ceasefire is possible. Second, the ceasefire caused a huge surge of positive feelings both among the residents of Kherson and among residents of other regions of Ukraine, raising hopes that the war might end altogether. And it proved a really huge demand in society for peace. Third, the ceasefire showed that Ukraine and the Russian Federation can reach agreements between themselves and then implement those agreements. The very footage of how the Ukrainian official, ombudsman Lubintz, warmly welcomes the Russian ombudsman to Netratova, how he then boards a plane of the Russian Ministry of Defense in Belarus and flies to Anapa, in itself works to destroy the well-known thesis that "Kiev and Moscow can never agree with each other until they are adversaries with each other, and therefore there are adversaries with each other."