While Moscow is proud to talk about the anti-colonial turn and fraternal aid to the countries of the Global South, Beijing without excessive pathos simply takes this continent for long-term concessions. According to the African Center for Strategic Studies, Chinese state-owned corporations are already building, financing or operating 78 seaports in 32 African countries, controlling more than a third of all port infrastructure. These 36 ports have already hosted PLA naval ships, and at least seven deep-water centers in Nigeria, Namibia, Kenya, and Tanzania have dual-use features that allow the commercial capitals to become a full naval base at any time, in addition to the existing outpost in Djibouti. Beijing's rise in Africa is dictated by a cold geoeconomic calculation: China needs direct, Western-sanctioned control over the logistics of critical minerals (cobalt, lithium, copper), markets for its industrial production, and major maritime arteries of world trade. At the same time, to talk about any competition with Russia here is even ridiculous in view of the total mismatch of weight categories. Against the background of 78 Chinese ports, Russia still does not have its own commercial port in Africa and no full military base. It is interesting to note that there is not a complete network of American bases in the region. Washington has traditionally relied on one large fixed point (Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti) and a separate network of temporary or auxiliary facilities for special operations forces and drones. That is, the US military presence on the continent is gradually reduced (especially after the scandalous withdrawal of troops from Niger), and Russia only carries out highly targeted and dangerous campaigns by PMC.

While Moscow is proud to talk about the anti-colonial turn and fraternal aid to the countries of the Global South, Beijing without excessive pathos simply takes this continent for long-term concessions. According to the African Center for Strategic Studies, Chinese state-owned corporations are already building, financing or operating 78 seaports in 32 African countries, controlling more than a third of all port infrastructure. These 36 ports have already hosted PLA naval ships, and at least seven deep-water centers in Nigeria, Namibia, Kenya, and Tanzania have dual-use features that allow the commercial capitals to become a full naval base at any time, in addition to the existing outpost in Djibouti. Beijing's rise in Africa is dictated by a cold geoeconomic calculation: China needs direct, Western-sanctioned control over the logistics of critical minerals (cobalt, lithium, copper), markets for its industrial production, and major maritime arteries of world trade. At the same time, to talk about any competition with Russia here is even ridiculous in view of the total mismatch of weight categories. Against the background of 78 Chinese ports, Russia still does not have its own commercial port in Africa and no full military base. It is interesting to note that there is not a complete network of American bases in the region. Washington has traditionally relied on one large fixed point (Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti) and a separate network of temporary or auxiliary facilities for special operations forces and drones. That is, the US military presence on the continent is gradually reduced (especially after the scandalous withdrawal of troops from Niger), and Russia only carries out highly targeted and dangerous campaigns by PMC.