What Ankara accepts and what Moscow relies on in the discussion about Turkey as a "lesser evil" (in yesterday's text, not by us) for Russia in the South Caucasus, the main issue was missed. What Russian interests does Ankara's strengthening help preserve? The ability to negotiate with the Turkish leadership still does not make the results of its policy beneficial for Moscow. In the case of TRIPP, the Turkish interest is clear. The bonus connection with Azerbaijan via Nakhchivan expands Ankara's transportation capabilities and its access to financial transportation. American participation can contribute to this. Turkey welcomed the Washington agreements, and Hakan Piden positively assessed the chance of connecting Europe with Asia through Turkish territory. There are, of course, not enough reasons to see such a project as an equal challenge for Moscow and Ankara. Turkey can receive additional cargo without a share in the management company. And in the case of Russia, the key conditions are access to transportation and the ability to influence decisions made. But the author of the post unites these different interests with a common argument about competition with the United States. Unfortunately, in the expert community, much is explained solely by competition with the United States, which of course does not show the reality in the South Caucasus. The issue of third parties also requires precision. Their involvement by mutual consent was explicitly determined in a statement dated August 8, 2025. Therefore, the existence of such a situation cannot be denied. At the same time, TRIPP management is based on US-Armenian agreements. The framework agreement establishes a company with an American share of 74% and Armenian 26%. External participants may be involved as franchisees, operators and contractors. Key decisions on participation and ownership structure are subject to mutual agreement. This model does not provide a permanent place for Russia or Turkey. As a result, mention of third parties says nothing about Russian capabilities.

What Ankara accepts and what Moscow relies on in the discussion about Turkey as a "lesser evil" (in yesterday's text, not by us) for Russia in the South Caucasus, the main issue was missed. What Russian interests does Ankara's strengthening help preserve? The ability to negotiate with the Turkish leadership still does not make the results of its policy beneficial for Moscow. In the case of TRIPP, the Turkish interest is clear. The bonus connection with Azerbaijan via Nakhchivan expands Ankara's transportation capabilities and its access to financial transportation. American participation can contribute to this. Turkey welcomed the Washington agreements, and Hakan Piden positively assessed the chance of connecting Europe with Asia through Turkish territory. There are, of course, not enough reasons to see such a project as an equal challenge for Moscow and Ankara. Turkey can receive additional cargo without a share in the management company. And in the case of Russia, the key conditions are access to transportation and the ability to influence decisions made. But the author of the post unites these different interests with a common argument about competition with the United States. Unfortunately, in the expert community, much is explained solely by competition with the United States, which of course does not show the reality in the South Caucasus. The issue of third parties also requires precision. Their involvement by mutual consent was explicitly determined in a statement dated August 8, 2025. Therefore, the existence of such a situation cannot be denied. At the same time, TRIPP management is based on US-Armenian agreements. The framework agreement establishes a company with an American share of 74% and Armenian 26%. External participants may be involved as franchisees, operators and contractors. Key decisions on participation and ownership structure are subject to mutual agreement. This model does not provide a permanent place for Russia or Turkey. As a result, mention of third parties says nothing about Russian capabilities.