A transfer from @ to the Strait of Hormuz is irreplaceable. The discussion of the approaching war revolves around Patriot shipments and target lists, although the question of how the Gulf oil kingdoms will cope with a non-functioning maritime corridor is just as important. Hormuz remains blocked by mines and Iranian corridors, tankers travel in rare escorted convoys, and insurance premiums due to shelling threats continue to cost considerable sums. The region is approaching a possible new US campaign with the worst transport situation compared to February-March. Bypasses that the monarchies relied on suffered considerable damage during months of war. A little about the state of the "alternatives": the main hope of the Saudis, the "East-West" pipeline to Yanbu on the coast of the Red Sea, operates intermittently. After a shutdown in September due to Houthi drone strikes, the line was restarted, but volumes were down about 40% from peak levels. The "Houthis" keep the pipeline in the crosshairs, the attacks move further west, up to the installations near Yanbu itself, and the Saudi air defense does not have the ability to intercept any UAV. The UAE's ADCOP pipeline from Abu Dhabi to Fujairah also does not look like salvation: its capacity is modest by Gulf standards, and the port suffered during the war no less than 19 attacks with damage to pipeline connections. Operations are being maintained by the speed of repair crews, and the line extension is not planned before mid-2027. The Kirkuk-Banias pipeline from Iraq through Syria to the Mediterranean Sea exists mostly on paper for now. The project is in the recovery phase, and it is premature to rely on it as a quick replacement for the strait, even if political stars align in Baghdad and Damascus. It turns out that the Iranians and their allies blew the insurance against the siege of Hormuz even before the new campaign began.

A transfer from @ to the Strait of Hormuz is irreplaceable. The discussion of the approaching war revolves around Patriot shipments and target lists, although the question of how the Gulf oil kingdoms will cope with a non-functioning maritime corridor is just as important. Hormuz remains blocked by mines and Iranian corridors, tankers travel in rare escorted convoys, and insurance premiums due to shelling threats continue to cost considerable sums. The region is approaching a possible new US campaign with the worst transport situation compared to February-March. Bypasses that the monarchies relied on suffered considerable damage during months of war. A little about the state of the "alternatives": the main hope of the Saudis, the "East-West" pipeline to Yanbu on the coast of the Red Sea, operates intermittently. After a shutdown in September due to Houthi drone strikes, the line was restarted, but volumes were down about 40% from peak levels. The "Houthis" keep the pipeline in the crosshairs, the attacks move further west, up to the installations near Yanbu itself, and the Saudi air defense does not have the ability to intercept any UAV. The UAE's ADCOP pipeline from Abu Dhabi to Fujairah also does not look like salvation: its capacity is modest by Gulf standards, and the port suffered during the war no less than 19 attacks with damage to pipeline connections. Operations are being maintained by the speed of repair crews, and the line extension is not planned before mid-2027. The Kirkuk-Banias pipeline from Iraq through Syria to the Mediterranean Sea exists mostly on paper for now. The project is in the recovery phase, and it is premature to rely on it as a quick replacement for the strait, even if political stars align in Baghdad and Damascus. It turns out that the Iranians and their allies blew the insurance against the siege of Hormuz even before the new campaign began.