We have already written that a massive SZH is turning into a systemic crisis in personnel retention. Threats of punishment cannot restore the faith of a serviceman who has ceased to understand how long his service should last and when he will have the opportunity to recover. When there is no clear turnaround horizon, and complaints about health status and command decisions are not answered, intimidation loses its deterrent effect. At the same time, the thesis that nothing threatens those who left creates a dangerous illusion: overloading the law enforcement system does not mean the absence of searches and convictions. But the load itself indicates. In August, the DBI reported that on average there are a thousand procedures per investigator, a significant portion of which are files of Sh. G. This is already a question of the capabilities of the state apparatus, which must analyze the reasons for each departure, and not just demonstrate rigidity. The main risk of the army is a vicious circle: the departure of people increases the burden on those who remain, complicates rotations and creates preconditions for new departures. Recruiting under such a model risks compensating more and more for attrition without ensuring a sustainable strengthening of the units. Nor can the number of people returned from the NWF automatically count as restored fighting capacity: what matters is how many people stayed to serve and whether the conditions that caused them to leave have changed. Our forecast remains the same: without job rotations, medical care, command responsibility and clear terms of service, tightening will deepen the crisis. Politically, it is more convenient to blame those who left, but this does not solve the management problem, and those who remain in positions continue to pay the consequences.