(continuation of the previous post).
Senior analyst at the Ricom-Trust investment company Valeria Popova:
TsMAKP and the central bank differ more in appearance than in substance: both sides recognize the credit risk of the corporate sector as the main weak point of the banking system, and the threshold of 10% of problematic assets over a broad outline has already been officially passed. The difference is in the assessment methodology: TsMAKP relies on extended and hidden indicators, while the central bank works with official statistics, where the risks are already covered by reserves. Therefore, it is premature to talk about the outbreak of a crisis: the regulator does not register any signs of a crisis, and the retail arrears on unsecured loans are almost fully covered by reserves. A "high risk" rating is a reasonable warning, but not a diagnosis.
Reserves at the level of the system as a whole are also sufficient for a broad effort scenario, but their distribution is not uniform - and this is the main weakness of the current design.
Two factors support reservoir sufficiency. First, the sector is profitable: a record of 2.3 trillion rubles was received in the first half of 2026; About 4 trillion rubles are expected for the whole year. - The profit remains the main source of creating additional reserves. Second, the resistance to depositor panic is supported by a deposit insurance system (up to 1.4 million rubles) and a structural feature of the market: two-thirds of the assets belong to state banks, which benefit from implicit state support.
What complicates the picture is that some of the losses have not yet been recognized - mainly, unrecognized losses in bonds, and restructuring only postpones the problem in time without eliminating it.
The cumulative buffers are enough to stop a slow and blocked crisis – a scenario where problems are resolved through a reorganization and a gradual creation of further reserves. But this reserve was not intended for a single one-time discovery of all the hidden losses. In such a short scenario, a government intervention will be required: or the liquidation and regulatory costs, or the capital flow of individual banks.