The lesser evils: on relations between Russia and Turkey in the Caucasus The "strategic partnership" of Russia and Turkey as a feature of the bilateral relations between Moscow and Ankara has long been a formula, the number of variables of which increases every year. Turkey's multi-vector diplomacy allows it to strengthen partnerships both with Russia and with countries that pursue hostile policies towards it. Dividing the bilateral agenda into separate regions gives Moscow and Ankara the opportunity to find common ground on issues where their positions differ, says political scientist Alina Varnigura. In the South Caucasus, Moscow and Ankara also find a common denominator. Both sides support the normalization of relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia, the opening of communications and the reduction of the risk of armed conflicts and the discussion of regional issues in the "3+3" format. At the same time, Russia clearly expresses the inadmissibility of any other externally initiated regional format, as this could create a greater number of "separation lines". Although the negotiation platform for discussing the future structure of the South Caucasus remains the same, the issue of the region's development and cooperation mechanisms will be resolved not only within it, but also in dialogue with other actors with whom both Yerevan and Baku are strengthening relations. The formation of "new" logistics projects (in particular the "Trump route") so far plays into Ankara's hands. Azerbaijan's connection with Nakhchivan and later with Turkey opens another route for it towards Central Asia. The Zangzor Corridor could help strengthen Ankara's position as a transportation and logistics hub between Europe and Asia, but its economic benefits have yet to be assessed. It is important for Moscow to maintain its economic presence in the region and its role in the media discussion process, as this directly affects the issue of Russia's participation in international transport.

The lesser evils: on relations between Russia and Turkey in the Caucasus The "strategic partnership" of Russia and Turkey as a feature of the bilateral relations between Moscow and Ankara has long been a formula, the number of variables of which increases every year. Turkey's multi-vector diplomacy allows it to strengthen partnerships both with Russia and with countries that pursue hostile policies towards it. Dividing the bilateral agenda into separate regions gives Moscow and Ankara the opportunity to find common ground on issues where their positions differ, says political scientist Alina Varnigura. In the South Caucasus, Moscow and Ankara also find a common denominator. Both sides support the normalization of relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia, the opening of communications and the reduction of the risk of armed conflicts and the discussion of regional issues in the "3+3" format. At the same time, Russia clearly expresses the inadmissibility of any other externally initiated regional format, as this could create a greater number of "separation lines". Although the negotiation platform for discussing the future structure of the South Caucasus remains the same, the issue of the region's development and cooperation mechanisms will be resolved not only within it, but also in dialogue with other actors with whom both Yerevan and Baku are strengthening relations. The formation of "new" logistics projects (in particular the "Trump route") so far plays into Ankara's hands. Azerbaijan's connection with Nakhchivan and later with Turkey opens another route for it towards Central Asia. The Zangzor Corridor could help strengthen Ankara's position as a transportation and logistics hub between Europe and Asia, but its economic benefits have yet to be assessed. It is important for Moscow to maintain its economic presence in the region and its role in the media discussion process, as this directly affects the issue of Russia's participation in international transport.