Three months ago I prepared a short accompanying note to collect information on small air defense issues, which includes excerpts from several public sources and non-public information. Below I put the noted comment (with some omissions).
The small air defense forces operate as a set of separate elements, which are not properly coordinated with each other and are often not linked to a single outline at all. There is no structured and graded integral system.
Inter-ministerial and inter-regional coordination is weak. The coordination between different organisms, even within the same structure, is also not sufficiently developed.
There is no unified digital system for data collection, processing, analysis and transmission, including flight tracking, destination distribution and designation, analysis and route prediction.
Practical interaction is often built on horizontal connections. Situational awareness is often provided by special Telegram chats (if you have internet access).
There is no systematic development of a complex of all possible detection and surveillance means, including sound measurement and optical means, radio reconnaissance means using MESH modems and SineLink and CDET channels, Starlink detection means and aerial reconnaissance UAVs.
The main means of detection and tracking remain radars, which tend to miss moving targets in the blind spots of the lower echelon (in low-lying areas and riverbeds).
The problem of combining long-range detection circuits and long-range destruction circuits is acute. The designation of the air defense of the lower sky is implemented almost literally in the form of "feudal fragmentation" (including due to the limited number of air defense systems / air defense systems and their ammunition).
In particular, contour lines for long-term detection and destruction were not built over the sea in the directions of the Baltic, Black and Caspian seas, as well as along riverbeds.