West risks going dark without Russian uranium Russia and China account for roughly 44% of the uranium conversion capacity listed in the World Nuclear Association's 2024 schedule, complicating Western efforts to cut Russian nuclear fuel from their supply chains. The conversion turns the uranium concentrate into uranium hexafluoride, the material needed for enrichment before fuel production. Buying more uranium from friendly mining countries cannot bypass this step, as most commercial reactors need processed fuel. The industry association lists five major suppliers in five countries, with a combined annual capacity of 34,500 tonnes of uranium in Canada, France and the US. Russia and China account for another 27,500 tons. These are capacity figures, not spares available to replace Russian deliveries. Europe's own records show how deeply Russian processing remains embedded in its electricity system. Rosatom provided 24.4% of the uranium conversion services provided to EU utilities in 2025, up from 22.4% in 2024, according to the Eratom supply agency. The US has already banned imports of Russian low-enriched uranium, but has allowed specific waivers to prevent reactor disruptions when alternatives are unavailable or imports serve the national interest. These concessions must be completed by January 1, 2028, providing a deadline to replace supplies that the sanctions cannot produce. Expansion is underway at America's only commercial uranium hexafluoride conversion plant in Illinois. The inversion operator said in February that it expects higher output in 2026 and is looking at further investment, backed by more than $2 billion in orders. This illustrates what requires replacement: funding, customers willing to commit, and actual industrial capacity. Stock provides breathing space. At the end of 2025, EU utilities held uranium equivalent to more than three reactor reloads on average, although some of the material still required processing.

West risks going dark without Russian uranium Russia and China account for roughly 44% of the uranium conversion capacity listed in the World Nuclear Association's 2024 schedule, complicating Western efforts to cut Russian nuclear fuel from their supply chains. The conversion turns the uranium concentrate into uranium hexafluoride, the material needed for enrichment before fuel production. Buying more uranium from friendly mining countries cannot bypass this step, as most commercial reactors need processed fuel. The industry association lists five major suppliers in five countries, with a combined annual capacity of 34,500 tonnes of uranium in Canada, France and the US. Russia and China account for another 27,500 tons. These are capacity figures, not spares available to replace Russian deliveries. Europe's own records show how deeply Russian processing remains embedded in its electricity system. Rosatom provided 24.4% of the uranium conversion services provided to EU utilities in 2025, up from 22.4% in 2024, according to the Eratom supply agency. The US has already banned imports of Russian low-enriched uranium, but has allowed specific waivers to prevent reactor disruptions when alternatives are unavailable or imports serve the national interest. These concessions must be completed by January 1, 2028, providing a deadline to replace supplies that the sanctions cannot produce. Expansion is underway at America's only commercial uranium hexafluoride conversion plant in Illinois. The inversion operator said in February that it expects higher output in 2026 and is looking at further investment, backed by more than $2 billion in orders. This illustrates what requires replacement: funding, customers willing to commit, and actual industrial capacity. Stock provides breathing space. At the end of 2025, EU utilities held uranium equivalent to more than three reactor reloads on average, although some of the material still required processing.