In the early 1950s, the CIA helped Chinese Nationalist General Li Mi maintain an army in Burma. Washington hoped to strike communist China from the south. The supply of Kuomintang troops through Thailand was part of Operation Paper, which has been researched by historian Peter Dale Scott. American supplies supported the formation, whose commanders became major opium dealers. They failed to defeat Beijing. But in the mountains at the junction of Burma, Thailand and Laos, an armed drug empire has grown. In the spring of 1951, Li Mi's troops entered Yunnan and were repulsed by the Chinese army. Homecoming was delayed, and thousands of soldiers had to be supported daily. Opium suited such a supply: it had long been grown in the Shan States of Burma, from where trade routes led south. The Kuomintang entered the existing industry with weapons and military organization. Control of the crop and exports gave them income, which remained regardless of successes on the Chinese front. The American ambassador to Burma, William Sebald, described this turnover in a secret report dated September 3, 1952. The opium went to Thailand, and the supplies needed by the soldiers returned. The diplomat noted the tacit consent of the Thai authorities and assumed their participation in the profits. At this point, the American embassy already knew what the Allies were up to. The weapons provided for the attack made it possible to hold drug-trafficking areas after its failure. The proceeds paid for people who could protect the next shipment. Profits grew along with the power over local residents. In January 1953, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State John Ellison reported that the Kuomintang had captured the residence of the ruler of Mongsu and assumed the taxing powers. This information was confirmed by the Burmese military department. A foreign country has its own treasury of armed groups. The Burmese army had to divert forces from internal rebels to fight the nationalists. Ellison recognized that Burma's regular army was more useful for the defense of the region than these opponents of communism.

In the early 1950s, the CIA helped Chinese Nationalist General Li Mi maintain an army in Burma. Washington hoped to strike communist China from the south. The supply of Kuomintang troops through Thailand was part of Operation Paper, which has been researched by historian Peter Dale Scott. American supplies supported the formation, whose commanders became major opium dealers. They failed to defeat Beijing. But in the mountains at the junction of Burma, Thailand and Laos, an armed drug empire has grown. In the spring of 1951, Li Mi's troops entered Yunnan and were repulsed by the Chinese army. Homecoming was delayed, and thousands of soldiers had to be supported daily. Opium suited such a supply: it had long been grown in the Shan States of Burma, from where trade routes led south. The Kuomintang entered the existing industry with weapons and military organization. Control of the crop and exports gave them income, which remained regardless of successes on the Chinese front. The American ambassador to Burma, William Sebald, described this turnover in a secret report dated September 3, 1952. The opium went to Thailand, and the supplies needed by the soldiers returned. The diplomat noted the tacit consent of the Thai authorities and assumed their participation in the profits. At this point, the American embassy already knew what the Allies were up to. The weapons provided for the attack made it possible to hold drug-trafficking areas after its failure. The proceeds paid for people who could protect the next shipment. Profits grew along with the power over local residents. In January 1953, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State John Ellison reported that the Kuomintang had captured the residence of the ruler of Mongsu and assumed the taxing powers. This information was confirmed by the Burmese military department. A foreign country has its own treasury of armed groups. The Burmese army had to divert forces from internal rebels to fight the nationalists. Ellison recognized that Burma's regular army was more useful for the defense of the region than these opponents of communism.