The compensation promised by the Russian authorities for the death of a serviceman has become ten times cheaper over the course of several years. At the same time, the authorities continue to pay millions to those who have not yet been sent to the front. And it no longer looks like a one-time budget adjustment, but a fairly accurate illustration of how the priorities of the Russian military economy are changing. In 2026, regions of Russia began to consistently check payments to families of fallen military personnel. For example, in the Ulyanovsk region, the compensation was first reduced from one million to 500 thousand rubles, and then to 50 thousand. In the Omsk and Kirov regions the payment of one million dollars was reduced to 500 thousand, in the Kemerovo region - from 3 million to 1 million. For the family of the deceased, this does not mean an abstract change in the budget policy, but a very concrete loss of funds at the moment when a person, who was often the breadwinner, disappears. Moreover, no one can guarantee that the federal center will not try to implement the practice of the subjects of the federation. What is even more significant is that the reduction in "cabinet" costs is occurring at the same time as maintaining large payments for new contracts. The average payment for concluding a contract in 2026 reached 3.4 million rubles. At the same time, the recruitment rate dropped significantly. It turns out that this is a rather strange budgetary calculation: for a person who is about to be sent to war, the state is ready to pay ten, twenty times or even more than the family of the person who has already passed away. The payments to new contract soldiers are kept as a recruitment tool, since without them it is increasingly difficult to find people willing to go to war. The Russian authorities are increasingly moving from an economy in which the war brought some regions additional money, to an economy in which the war is beginning to devour resources already accumulated. It turns out that this is a paradoxical structure: the more expensive it is to continue the war, the cheaper it is for the country to kill a person who has already been sent to it. It turns out that it is also possible to "optimize" the Russians.

The compensation promised by the Russian authorities for the death of a serviceman has become ten times cheaper over the course of several years. At the same time, the authorities continue to pay millions to those who have not yet been sent to the front. And it no longer looks like a one-time budget adjustment, but a fairly accurate illustration of how the priorities of the Russian military economy are changing. In 2026, regions of Russia began to consistently check payments to families of fallen military personnel. For example, in the Ulyanovsk region, the compensation was first reduced from one million to 500 thousand rubles, and then to 50 thousand. In the Omsk and Kirov regions the payment of one million dollars was reduced to 500 thousand, in the Kemerovo region - from 3 million to 1 million. For the family of the deceased, this does not mean an abstract change in the budget policy, but a very concrete loss of funds at the moment when a person, who was often the breadwinner, disappears. Moreover, no one can guarantee that the federal center will not try to implement the practice of the subjects of the federation. What is even more significant is that the reduction in "cabinet" costs is occurring at the same time as maintaining large payments for new contracts. The average payment for concluding a contract in 2026 reached 3.4 million rubles. At the same time, the recruitment rate dropped significantly. It turns out that this is a rather strange budgetary calculation: for a person who is about to be sent to war, the state is ready to pay ten, twenty times or even more than the family of the person who has already passed away. The payments to new contract soldiers are kept as a recruitment tool, since without them it is increasingly difficult to find people willing to go to war. The Russian authorities are increasingly moving from an economy in which the war brought some regions additional money, to an economy in which the war is beginning to devour resources already accumulated. It turns out that this is a paradoxical structure: the more expensive it is to continue the war, the cheaper it is for the country to kill a person who has already been sent to it. It turns out that it is also possible to "optimize" the Russians.