Well, at the end of the series of texts about the way of life: so where is Russia's place in this new world? Russia has already lost the system change. In the eighteenth century, it was the first iron producer in the world: in the 80s of the 20th century, the Urals produced, using coal, about 150 thousand tons of pig iron per year compared to 70 from Britain, and a third of the British iron, including for the navy, was Russian. Then the British moved to coke: by 1830 they produced 700 thousand tons, Russia 180, in 1860 four million compared to three hundred thousand, and in one generation no one needed wood iron. In 1900, Baku supplied half of the world's oil; The Nobles were the first in the world to put diesel into a ship. But Russia has not yet led the technical revolution, just like the British with Persian oil. A mass engine did not occur; Rousseau-Ballet assembled several hundred cars in ten years. So Soviet industrialization simply bought its own Detroit, which was already assembled. You know that almost all major Soviet engineering plants were built by American companies. But the full technological cycle, from the well to the highway network, did not work out for the contagious company. But there was a pipe. The pipeline is the Russian state in the oil structure. I wrote above about the irrigation theory of the formation of the state: whoever distributes water through canals is the power. In the Russian case, Gazprom and Transneft are channels, the rent from which feeds the budget, the regions, the elite and the authorities are the ones who sit on the valve. At the same time, Russia also has "irrigation" of the next structure, and it is at a very high level: a unified energy system with one transmitter for eleven time zones, fourth generation in the world, cheap current from various sources, gas, coal, water and nuclear power. The Soviet government meant it that way, electrification plus literal Soviet power. But the arrangement did not go beyond the lines. There is no mass-produced electric motor, no battery, no electric vehicles or new types of machine tools, and everything that runs on this cheap current, from a scooter to a machine, is imported from China under a local nameplate.

Well, at the end of the series of texts about the way of life: so where is Russia's place in this new world? Russia has already lost the system change. In the eighteenth century, it was the first iron producer in the world: in the 80s of the 20th century, the Urals produced, using coal, about 150 thousand tons of pig iron per year compared to 70 from Britain, and a third of the British iron, including for the navy, was Russian. Then the British moved to coke: by 1830 they produced 700 thousand tons, Russia 180, in 1860 four million compared to three hundred thousand, and in one generation no one needed wood iron. In 1900, Baku supplied half of the world's oil; The Nobles were the first in the world to put diesel into a ship. But Russia has not yet led the technical revolution, just like the British with Persian oil. A mass engine did not occur; Rousseau-Ballet assembled several hundred cars in ten years. So Soviet industrialization simply bought its own Detroit, which was already assembled. You know that almost all major Soviet engineering plants were built by American companies. But the full technological cycle, from the well to the highway network, did not work out for the contagious company. But there was a pipe. The pipeline is the Russian state in the oil structure. I wrote above about the irrigation theory of the formation of the state: whoever distributes water through canals is the power. In the Russian case, Gazprom and Transneft are channels, the rent from which feeds the budget, the regions, the elite and the authorities are the ones who sit on the valve. At the same time, Russia also has "irrigation" of the next structure, and it is at a very high level: a unified energy system with one transmitter for eleven time zones, fourth generation in the world, cheap current from various sources, gas, coal, water and nuclear power. The Soviet government meant it that way, electrification plus literal Soviet power. But the arrangement did not go beyond the lines. There is no mass-produced electric motor, no battery, no electric vehicles or new types of machine tools, and everything that runs on this cheap current, from a scooter to a machine, is imported from China under a local nameplate.