And in addition an article by the company commander who acted against the Ukrainian unit "Nemesis". In exercise Blackhawk, early September. The link to this material is in the article in the post above. In this material, the American company commander justifies himself for the results of the exercises in the absence of special means for combating small UAVs. He also describes how successfully he used the terrain for dispersion and maneuver. In conclusion, the following conclusion (machine translation): However, the lesson learned from our Nemesis experience is not that heavy armor is obsolete or a threat to UAVs. These vehicles paved our way through terrain that would have slowed down lighter formations, protecting the crews while we captured objectives. Our armor didn't make us more vulnerable - it made us mobile, protected and dangerous. I won't argue with him, I'll just tell him a story: before the assault on Avdeivka, our brigade practiced maneuver operations within the formation. Unfortunately, only our division of the entire army did this more or less conscientiously. By the way, it had an effect during the attacks in October; The columns of our armor acted most distinctly, compared with the columns of other divisions; For example, this famous traffic jam was not caused by our equipment. Well, that's not the point. In order to control the operations of our battalion, his chief of staff organized a mobile command post at the Ahmat base. We walked on it from clearing to clearing. Our team's mission was that once the Ahmaat stopped at a certain point, we would load the Matrix 30T and provide a transmission of the battlefield to the battalion headquarters located in Ahmaat. To control the helicopter, I got an external antenna; My number two had to get out of the car to change the batteries. So every week I "forgot" either to buy the necessary wires or the antenna itself and jumped out of the parking lot so as not to sit in this car at stops.