The Kremlin is looking for more money for the war amid a ruined budget. An interesting pattern emerges here: the state is increasingly claiming the property of large businesses, trying to return capital that goes abroad and at the same time strengthening control over financial flows. All of this happens at the same time as the tax burden increases. As a result, it seems that the Russian financial system is gradually moving from a regime where large private capital was one of the main partners of the state to a state where this capital is seen as a reserve from which resources can be drawn for the continuation of the war. Against the background of seizing foreign businesses, the campaign to divide property from Russian owners continues. Proximity to Putin no longer seems like a guarantee of immunity. The Kremlin needs money, factories, ports, gold, agricultural holdings, cement, chemicals, real estate - everything that can be built into the government system or simply come under the control of more loyal owners. Today in Russia it is difficult to name a big businessman who can see his property completely protected from state claims. The war is gradually changing the very principle of the relationship between the Russian state and private capital. In times of peace, big business was a source of taxes, investment, jobs and political support for the Kremlin. In a prolonged war it also becomes a source of reserves. There are two answers to the question of how much the war destroyed the Russian budget. The first will be available when classified data on actual military spending is available. The second is already visible today - from the behavior of the state itself. It raises taxes, increases loans, uses reserves, looks for ways to bring capital back from abroad, restricts certain avenues for attracting capital, and increasingly seizes large private assets. This still does not mean the imminent financial collapse of the Russian economy.