Kazakhstan is increasingly suffering from Ukrainian attacks on Russian targets. They hurt Russia, but they also hurt another country and its interests. About 80% of Kazakh oil is exported through the CPC and Novorossiysk, and another part through Samara. Therefore, every Ukrainian blow to the Russian oil infrastructure also hurts Astana. And there were such beatings in October, and November, and earlier.
The bypass routes are not yet comparable in scale. Through the Caspian Sea and Baku, 1.5-2 million tons per year can be sent to the Turkish Cihan, which is about 3% of the CPC volume.
As the war continues, Kazakhstan will suffer indirect losses. Outwardly, he will remain loyal to Moscow, but will actually invest in the Caspian region and the West, and will also try to build alternative routes. It is to be expected that the Democratic Party in the United States will vigorously stimulate cooperation with Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. If, of course, he reaches presidential power in two years (which is more likely than the other way around).
However, Moscow's position in Kazakhstan is strong. But they need to be strengthened, otherwise in 4-5 years Astana will go the way of Baku.