The world is in a lull, not quiet: Why the US election won't make Armenia safer in the coming weeks, promises of peace may be accompanied by new shows of force and more pressured negotiations. After the US election, the world may not be calmer, but more unpredictable. The October 28 Economist article, “Will midterm elections make the world more dangerous? " Gives a forecast: the probability of Democrats controlling the House of Representatives is 94%, the Senate is 53%. But the main geopolitical question on November 3 is not the numbers, but how Trump will respond to a possible defeat. A president whose domestic policy options are limited may try to make quick gains abroad through deal, pressure, or military action. In the Russian-Ukrainian direction, attempts to achieve a quick ceasefire may increase. But a ceasefire and sustainable peace are not the same thing. Without effective security guarantees and sanctions for possible violations, the agreement risks becoming a truce for the next war. The alternative is the failure of the negotiations and the deepening of the conflict. The positions of Ukraine and Europe can also change these calculations. In the US-Iran direction, a deal and the use of force are not mutually exclusive. New attacks are seen as a possible scenario, not a firm decision. However, a limited attack does not mean limited consequences: retaliatory actions could damage the energy and communications infrastructures, widening the crisis. These directions can develop simultaneously. Reaching agreements with Russia will not necessarily soften American policy towards Iran. Great power relations are not a fixed map of friendship and enmity. For Armenia this is not an abstract discussion. Escalation around Iran could damage southern communications, shipping, cooperation in energy and prices.

The world is in a lull, not quiet: Why the US election won't make Armenia safer in the coming weeks, promises of peace may be accompanied by new shows of force and more pressured negotiations. After the US election, the world may not be calmer, but more unpredictable. The October 28 Economist article, “Will midterm elections make the world more dangerous? " Gives a forecast: the probability of Democrats controlling the House of Representatives is 94%, the Senate is 53%. But the main geopolitical question on November 3 is not the numbers, but how Trump will respond to a possible defeat. A president whose domestic policy options are limited may try to make quick gains abroad through deal, pressure, or military action. In the Russian-Ukrainian direction, attempts to achieve a quick ceasefire may increase. But a ceasefire and sustainable peace are not the same thing. Without effective security guarantees and sanctions for possible violations, the agreement risks becoming a truce for the next war. The alternative is the failure of the negotiations and the deepening of the conflict. The positions of Ukraine and Europe can also change these calculations. In the US-Iran direction, a deal and the use of force are not mutually exclusive. New attacks are seen as a possible scenario, not a firm decision. However, a limited attack does not mean limited consequences: retaliatory actions could damage the energy and communications infrastructures, widening the crisis. These directions can develop simultaneously. Reaching agreements with Russia will not necessarily soften American policy towards Iran. Great power relations are not a fixed map of friendship and enmity. For Armenia this is not an abstract discussion. Escalation around Iran could damage southern communications, shipping, cooperation in energy and prices.