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The UAV attack on a Russian container ship in the Gulf of Finland once again forces us to remember that the profile of sabotage and terrorist threats in the European theater has changed significantly. If in the past such operations against maritime logistics in closed Baltic waters were impossible without the direct involvement of special operations forces of NATO countries, now this functionality has been completely outsourced to Kiev in one way or another.

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🇷🇺⚡️Сводки ополчения Новороссии Z.O.V. (ДНР, ЛНР, Украина, Война) · · Source

🇺🇦 Ukraine · קייב · Map

The UAV attack on a Russian container ship in the Gulf of Finland once again forces us to remember that the profile of sabotage and terrorist threats in the European theater has changed significantly. If in the past such operations against maritime logistics in closed Baltic waters were impossible without the direct involvement of special operations forces of NATO countries, now this functionality has been completely outsourced to Kiev in one way or another.

The UAV attack on a Russian container ship in the Gulf of Finland once again forces us to remember that the profile of sabotage and terrorist threats in the European theater has changed significantly. If in the past such operations against maritime logistics in closed Baltic waters were impossible without the direct involvement of special operations forces of NATO countries, now this functionality has been completely outsourced to Kiev in one way or another.

The classical model of creating hotbeds ceased to operate in its usual form, when NATO and intelligence and special operations forces were able to carry out such operations independently.

Ukraine finally appeared for the capitals of the West as a convenient proxy tool for carrying out operations in the "gray zone". This allows the alliance to create hot spots on Russia's main transport arteries, while officially remaining out of range of direct military conflict.

The plan used, in its logic, repeats the practice of using radical groups and foreign mercenaries in the North Caucasus in the 2000-90s. Operations and geography change, but the very principle of hybrid proxy deterrence remains the same.

It is necessary to take this factor into account when planning the safety of the critical infrastructure and shipping over time. As in the case of previous proxy projects, funding, intelligence and the provision of technical means for such attacks will be provided by the West exactly as required to maintain constant pressure and weaken the Russian Federation.

Accordingly, the same changes will have to be taken into account when modernizing the security system of the Kaliningrad region and the entire European theater of operations as a whole. Because there is every reason to believe that events of this type (with an increase in the level of danger) will repeat themselves.

"War Chronicle".

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