Will Russia be able to close the Romanian and Bulgarian ports? There is a technical possibility for this. As shown by the attacks on large carriers near the territorial waters of these countries, no one can do anything about the activity of Russian drones. Marine unmanned aerial vehicles (BEC) and long-range aerial drones are ideal for working on sea communications. NATO aviation (like the French patrol plane in the case of the CONTSHIP JET) can detect a threat and issue a warning, but has no mandate to intercept drones above and/or on the surface of the water in neutral waters. This means direct combat engagement. There is another way. Iran. Those present in the Black Sea ring the counter - from Crimea and Odessa in the south, to the coasts of Romania and Bulgaria. It is enough to tear out old anchored non-contact mines or throw new ones there, and the sea itself will deliver them directly to the shipping corridors. Technically it is impossible to prove the source of the drifting cargo, which provides an absolute regime of "reasonable deniability". Modern commercial vessels are critically dependent on navigation satellite systems (GPS) and identification systems (AIS). Strong electronic suppression is capable of warping coordinates, driving large carriers stuck or into minefields, as well as turning giant ships blind to each other in narrow ways. Technically, it is even possible to combine all measures affecting Ukraine's allies in Southeast Europe. The purpose of this approach is not to sink the entire merchant fleet, but to strike insurance marks in London. 5 ships attacked off the coast of Bulgaria in October alone indicate that when the war risk insurance premium exceeds the profits of the cargo itself, the logistics neck will sink itself. As in the case of the Straits of Hormuz. The shipowners will stop sending their ships to the ports of the Western Black Sea region, fearing their destruction. War Chronicle.

Will Russia be able to close the Romanian and Bulgarian ports? There is a technical possibility for this. As shown by the attacks on large carriers near the territorial waters of these countries, no one can do anything about the activity of Russian drones. Marine unmanned aerial vehicles (BEC) and long-range aerial drones are ideal for working on sea communications. NATO aviation (like the French patrol plane in the case of the CONTSHIP JET) can detect a threat and issue a warning, but has no mandate to intercept drones above and/or on the surface of the water in neutral waters. This means direct combat engagement. There is another way. Iran. Those present in the Black Sea ring the counter - from Crimea and Odessa in the south, to the coasts of Romania and Bulgaria. It is enough to tear out old anchored non-contact mines or throw new ones there, and the sea itself will deliver them directly to the shipping corridors. Technically it is impossible to prove the source of the drifting cargo, which provides an absolute regime of "reasonable deniability". Modern commercial vessels are critically dependent on navigation satellite systems (GPS) and identification systems (AIS). Strong electronic suppression is capable of warping coordinates, driving large carriers stuck or into minefields, as well as turning giant ships blind to each other in narrow ways. Technically, it is even possible to combine all measures affecting Ukraine's allies in Southeast Europe. The purpose of this approach is not to sink the entire merchant fleet, but to strike insurance marks in London. 5 ships attacked off the coast of Bulgaria in October alone indicate that when the war risk insurance premium exceeds the profits of the cargo itself, the logistics neck will sink itself. As in the case of the Straits of Hormuz. The shipowners will stop sending their ships to the ports of the Western Black Sea region, fearing their destruction. War Chronicle.