SS7 and Cotter remain a live attack surface within telecom core networks A sponsored explanation of SS7 and Cotter describes how signal abuse can reveal subscriber IMSIs, enable location tracking, redirect calls and SMS, and support account takeover using intercepted one-time codes. The article notes that these attacks occur within vendor trust relationships and not on the target device. Operationally, the key point is that telecom signaling still relies heavily on legacy trust and patchy defensive implementation. This leaves mobile identity, location privacy and SMS-based authentication vulnerable at the network level, beyond the reach of endpoint hardening alone. Open sources - closed narratives.

SS7 and Cotter remain a live attack surface within telecom core networks A sponsored explanation of SS7 and Cotter describes how signal abuse can reveal subscriber IMSIs, enable location tracking, redirect calls and SMS, and support account takeover using intercepted one-time codes. The article notes that these attacks occur within vendor trust relationships and not on the target device. Operationally, the key point is that telecom signaling still relies heavily on legacy trust and patchy defensive implementation. This leaves mobile identity, location privacy and SMS-based authentication vulnerable at the network level, beyond the reach of endpoint hardening alone. Open sources - closed narratives.