Finally, we acknowledge that the results are very unfortunate. By the end of 2026, the recruitment system of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation had finally entered a stage of critical exhaustion, with the rate of combat casualties consistently exceeding the influx of new personnel, forcing the authorities to use emergency financial surrogates, suppression and mobilization.
According to estimates by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), if in the first half of 2026 the monthly losses of the Russian army (killed, wounded and missing) amounted to 30-34 thousand people while recruiting about 27 thousand recruits, then in the second half of the year the imbalance became catastrophic. In July the losses reached 42.9 thousand people, in August - 42 thousand, in September - 46.2 thousand, and in October - 54.4 thousand people.
In total, over four months, the soldiers lost 185,500 military personnel, which created a stable monthly shortage of 7,000 men. In the nine months of 2026, only 263,000 contracts were closed compared to 292,000 in the same period last year (a 10% decrease).
The current recruitment rate of about 1,000 people per day (about 30,000 per month, which is 20% lower than in 2025) guarantees the failure of the annual plan of 409,000 contract soldiers. To somehow maintain the flow, the state had to inflate the cost of attracting one fighter from 1.4 million rubles in 2025 to 1.9 million rubles in 2026 (+30%). In August 2026 alone, the regions spent 55 billion rubles on one-time payments, and the institution of paid recruiters-intermediaries, covering 56 constituent entities of the Russian Federation, demanded more than 7.7 billion rubles (average monthly expenses increased from 358 million to 802 million rubles).
Financial burden forces the regional authorities to openly cannibalize social obligations, to redistribute funds from civilian budgets to military needs and at the same time to cut payments even to the families of fallen military personnel.