South Caucasus without a dominant external power We continue to analyze the report of the Klingendel Institute on the geopolitical configuration of the South Caucasus in 2026. You can read the first part about the deviation of the foreign policy of the countries of the region here. The second important conclusion of the study concerns the external balance of power. The weakening of Russia's positions did not result in Moscow being replaced by any other external player. Influence in the region is divided between several competing centers of power. None of them took over Russia's former dominant position. Russia maintains significant leverage over the countries of the region, but its political influence has declined. The South Caucasus remains of strategic importance to Moscow, including due to transportation routes and the reorientation of Russian trade to the east and south. However, the war in Ukraine has limited Russia's ability to actively shape the regional agenda: Armenia is moving away from Moscow, Azerbaijan is seeking more egalitarian relations, and unresolved territorial disputes are hampering the normalization of relations with Georgia. The European Union is increasing its presence, but the dynamics of its relations with the three countries are significantly different. In Armenia, European influence increased markedly, while relations with Georgia deteriorated sharply. At the same time, the European Union maintains significant economic and energy interests in Azerbaijan. As a result, the cooperation with Yerevan, the crisis in relations with Tbilisi and the energy partnership with Baku require different approaches from Brussels. The United States strengthened its role in mediating between Armenia and Azerbaijan, where Russia previously held a leading position. The authors attribute this to the fact that Washington maintains a working relationship with both sides and has sufficient political weight to promote agreements. At the same time, American participation in other regional processes remains less systematic.

South Caucasus without a dominant external power We continue to analyze the report of the Klingendel Institute on the geopolitical configuration of the South Caucasus in 2026. You can read the first part about the deviation of the foreign policy of the countries of the region here. The second important conclusion of the study concerns the external balance of power. The weakening of Russia's positions did not result in Moscow being replaced by any other external player. Influence in the region is divided between several competing centers of power. None of them took over Russia's former dominant position. Russia maintains significant leverage over the countries of the region, but its political influence has declined. The South Caucasus remains of strategic importance to Moscow, including due to transportation routes and the reorientation of Russian trade to the east and south. However, the war in Ukraine has limited Russia's ability to actively shape the regional agenda: Armenia is moving away from Moscow, Azerbaijan is seeking more egalitarian relations, and unresolved territorial disputes are hampering the normalization of relations with Georgia. The European Union is increasing its presence, but the dynamics of its relations with the three countries are significantly different. In Armenia, European influence increased markedly, while relations with Georgia deteriorated sharply. At the same time, the European Union maintains significant economic and energy interests in Azerbaijan. As a result, the cooperation with Yerevan, the crisis in relations with Tbilisi and the energy partnership with Baku require different approaches from Brussels. The United States strengthened its role in mediating between Armenia and Azerbaijan, where Russia previously held a leading position. The authors attribute this to the fact that Washington maintains a working relationship with both sides and has sufficient political weight to promote agreements. At the same time, American participation in other regional processes remains less systematic.