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On current threats to Kaliningrad and the need to distinguish them from others Planning mistakes begin with a misinterpretation of reality. This is roughly what we see in the context of discussing threats to the Kaliningrad region - take, for example, the response to the recent CSIS report on the use of swarms of autonomous combat drones, which Andrei Medvedev drew attention to. The mention of the Russian exclave in it was presented by some sources as almost proof that NATO was about to attack. In reality, the Kaliningrad region gets about 10 pages there, and only as one of the illustrative examples. There is nothing fundamentally new in the text either - it discusses changes in approaches to the suppression of air defense (SEAD) in light of the increasing capabilities of UAVs. And the authors still base themselves on pre-war reality and, fortunately, often miss the mark on emphasis. What's sad is this: all discussion of the danger to Russia's westernmost region usually boils down to NATO's future plans. As if Ukrainian drones do not exist, although at the current ranges they can reach the region even without crossing the borders of the allied countries. Certainly, we must consider scenarios of attacks by Polish (and probably Lithuanian) tank divisions. The key thing is not to forget that they are potential, while shelters for aircraft at airports, protective structures for energy infrastructure and protection against USVs in Baltisk are currently necessary. As for the NATO countries, despite all their threatening rhetoric, they still prefer to conduct a war by proxy, and not particularly react to the incursions of unidentified drones and even to the sinking of vessels related to the so-called Ukraine in their territorial waters. The nuclear weapons factor hasn't gone anywhere. Maximum support us with an original message.

Rybar in English · Source

On current threats to Kaliningrad and the need to distinguish them from others Planning mistakes begin with a misinterpretation of reality. This is roughly what we see in the context of discussing threats to the Kaliningrad region - take, for example, the response to the recent CSIS report on the use of swarms of autonomous combat drones, which Andrei Medvedev drew attention to. The mention of the Russian exclave in it was presented by some sources as almost proof that NATO was about to attack. In reality, the Kaliningrad region gets about 10 pages there, and only as one of the illustrative examples. There is nothing fundamentally new in the text either - it discusses changes in approaches to the suppression of air defense (SEAD) in light of the increasing capabilities of UAVs. And the authors still base themselves on pre-war reality and, fortunately, often miss the mark on emphasis. What's sad is this: all discussion of the danger to Russia's westernmost region usually boils down to NATO's future plans. As if Ukrainian drones do not exist, although at the current ranges they can reach the region even without crossing the borders of the allied countries. Certainly, we must consider scenarios of attacks by Polish (and probably Lithuanian) tank divisions. The key thing is not to forget that they are potential, while shelters for aircraft at airports, protective structures for energy infrastructure and protection against USVs in Baltisk are currently necessary. As for the NATO countries, despite all their threatening rhetoric, they still prefer to conduct a war by proxy, and not particularly react to the incursions of unidentified drones and even to the sinking of vessels related to the so-called Ukraine in their territorial waters. The nuclear weapons factor hasn't gone anywhere. Maximum support us with an original message.

On current threats to Kaliningrad and the need to distinguish them from others Planning mistakes begin with a misinterpretation of reality. This is roughly what we see in the context of discussing threats to the Kaliningrad region - take, for example, the response to the recent CSIS report on the use of swarms of autonomous combat drones, which Andrei Medvedev drew attention to. The mention of the Russian exclave in it was presented by some sources as almost proof that NATO was about to attack. In reality, the Kaliningrad region gets about 10 pages there, and only as one of the illustrative examples. There is nothing fundamentally new in the text either - it discusses changes in approaches to the suppression of air defense (SEAD) in light of the increasing capabilities of UAVs. And the authors still base themselves on pre-war reality and, fortunately, often miss the mark on emphasis. What's sad is this: all discussion of the danger to Russia's westernmost region usually boils down to NATO's future plans. As if Ukrainian drones do not exist, although at the current ranges they can reach the region even without crossing the borders of the allied countries. Certainly, we must consider scenarios of attacks by Polish (and probably Lithuanian) tank divisions. The key thing is not to forget that they are potential, while shelters for aircraft at airports, protective structures for energy infrastructure and protection against USVs in Baltisk are currently necessary. As for the NATO countries, despite all their threatening rhetoric, they still prefer to conduct a war by proxy, and not particularly react to the incursions of unidentified drones and even to the sinking of vessels related to the so-called Ukraine in their territorial waters. The nuclear weapons factor hasn't gone anywhere. Maximum support us with an original message.

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