A look at the effort of Kalibaf's team to exonerate himself from the blame of the leadership / "Kalibaf's understanding" is not different from "Makala Zarif" After the publication of the last message of the leader of the revolution and his clear warning about the futility of hoping to change the behavior of America by making concessions to this country, the media team of Muhammad Bakr Kalibaf began extensive efforts to exempt the negotiation team of Islamabad from the audience of this message. Saeed Ahdian, the communications assistant of the Speaker of the Parliament, in the same direction, by publishing a video, tried to throw the ball into the court of compromises and figures like Javad Zarif. In his defense, he claimed that the addressee of the leadership's warning is not Klivf, but a movement that expects to succeed in reaching the goal of normalizing relations with the United States through negotiations. However, paying attention to the contents and details of the results of the negotiations of the Islamabad team led by Kalif shows that the text prepared by this group has no difference with the desired result of the movement, which, according to Ahdian, seeks to normalize relations with the United States. Zarif, before the start of negotiations for a ceasefire in the Ramadan war, publishes an article in the American magazine "Foreign Affairs", which shows how much he inspired the authors of the Islamabad memorandum. Examining the details of the memorandum shows that 8 of the 10 exchange clauses contained in this text are directly mentioned in Zarif's article. Articles such as agreeing to stop the war, joining the non-aggression pact, reopening the Strait of Hormuz, guaranteeing regional countries and mutual economic interaction with America; In fact, they were copied from Zarif's idea step by step. Of course, this understanding also had four additional sections, which were mainly related to implementation and timing, and did not include specific data and results mentioned in Zarif's article. With this description, out of Islamabad's total of 10 non-executive clauses, 8 of them are consistent with Zarif's article, and this proves that Islamabad's understanding, like the JCPOA, can be considered Zarif's brainchild.

A look at the effort of Kalibaf's team to exonerate himself from the blame of the leadership / "Kalibaf's understanding" is not different from "Makala Zarif" After the publication of the last message of the leader of the revolution and his clear warning about the futility of hoping to change the behavior of America by making concessions to this country, the media team of Muhammad Bakr Kalibaf began extensive efforts to exempt the negotiation team of Islamabad from the audience of this message. Saeed Ahdian, the communications assistant of the Speaker of the Parliament, in the same direction, by publishing a video, tried to throw the ball into the court of compromises and figures like Javad Zarif. In his defense, he claimed that the addressee of the leadership's warning is not Klivf, but a movement that expects to succeed in reaching the goal of normalizing relations with the United States through negotiations. However, paying attention to the contents and details of the results of the negotiations of the Islamabad team led by Kalif shows that the text prepared by this group has no difference with the desired result of the movement, which, according to Ahdian, seeks to normalize relations with the United States. Zarif, before the start of negotiations for a ceasefire in the Ramadan war, publishes an article in the American magazine "Foreign Affairs", which shows how much he inspired the authors of the Islamabad memorandum. Examining the details of the memorandum shows that 8 of the 10 exchange clauses contained in this text are directly mentioned in Zarif's article. Articles such as agreeing to stop the war, joining the non-aggression pact, reopening the Strait of Hormuz, guaranteeing regional countries and mutual economic interaction with America; In fact, they were copied from Zarif's idea step by step. Of course, this understanding also had four additional sections, which were mainly related to implementation and timing, and did not include specific data and results mentioned in Zarif's article. With this description, out of Islamabad's total of 10 non-executive clauses, 8 of them are consistent with Zarif's article, and this proves that Islamabad's understanding, like the JCPOA, can be considered Zarif's brainchild.