changing the nuclear doctrine; Still not clear or has the end been announced? Dr. Muhammad Amin Baghrikani The main and basic policy of the Islamic Republic on nuclear weapons has been ambiguous for many years. By the way, our obvious and winning strategy in the current situation is to adopt this policy of nuclear ambiguity. Where the enemy cannot read our hand and consequently acts cautiously and passively in confrontation with us. Better yet, the policy of ambiguity, in its current state, acts as a deterrent for the Islamic Republic. The attack on our nuclear facilities was also designed to disable this policy, which has so far failed. Giving clarifications to each side of the issue, especially at this time, actually opens the hand of the other side to act against us. A fatwa of Imam Mujahid Shaheed also played a complementary role in this regard; Moreover, after its official announcement, Western analysts and politicians were taken to the Shia Halacha classes and added concepts such as Turia and Taqiyyah. As a result, although the leader of the dead of the revolution acted honestly in issuing a fatwa based on religious principles and the power of ijtihad, not even an iota of the policy of ambiguity of the Islamic Republic was reduced. During these years, two groups made great efforts to eliminate nuclear ambiguity. First, those who sold the country in the last decade to build trust and did not fail to take any action to relieve the country of this important lever, and of course they did not succeed. The second category is those who tried to provoke the government to build nuclear weapons (or sometimes reveal them) by proposing the idea of ​​changing the nuclear doctrine, and they also found a suitable social context, especially after the second imposed war. Meanwhile, the effort of some people to indicate the change of the country's nuclear doctrine is effective and useful as long as it is within the policy of ambiguity. Between the popular demands and statements of scientific, political and social figures without official responsibility in the country, it helps a lot in intensifying the existing ambiguity. Also, the presentation of the regime's official opinion on not building nuclear weapons, in accordance with the fatwa of Imam al-Ala Allah of Qamah al-Sharif Hanus, strengthened the policy of ambiguity in most cases.

changing the nuclear doctrine; Still not clear or has the end been announced? Dr. Muhammad Amin Baghrikani The main and basic policy of the Islamic Republic on nuclear weapons has been ambiguous for many years. By the way, our obvious and winning strategy in the current situation is to adopt this policy of nuclear ambiguity. Where the enemy cannot read our hand and consequently acts cautiously and passively in confrontation with us. Better yet, the policy of ambiguity, in its current state, acts as a deterrent for the Islamic Republic. The attack on our nuclear facilities was also designed to disable this policy, which has so far failed. Giving clarifications to each side of the issue, especially at this time, actually opens the hand of the other side to act against us. A fatwa of Imam Mujahid Shaheed also played a complementary role in this regard; Moreover, after its official announcement, Western analysts and politicians were taken to the Shia Halacha classes and added concepts such as Turia and Taqiyyah. As a result, although the leader of the dead of the revolution acted honestly in issuing a fatwa based on religious principles and the power of ijtihad, not even an iota of the policy of ambiguity of the Islamic Republic was reduced. During these years, two groups made great efforts to eliminate nuclear ambiguity. First, those who sold the country in the last decade to build trust and did not fail to take any action to relieve the country of this important lever, and of course they did not succeed. The second category is those who tried to provoke the government to build nuclear weapons (or sometimes reveal them) by proposing the idea of ​​changing the nuclear doctrine, and they also found a suitable social context, especially after the second imposed war. Meanwhile, the effort of some people to indicate the change of the country's nuclear doctrine is effective and useful as long as it is within the policy of ambiguity. Between the popular demands and statements of scientific, political and social figures without official responsibility in the country, it helps a lot in intensifying the existing ambiguity. Also, the presentation of the regime's official opinion on not building nuclear weapons, in accordance with the fatwa of Imam al-Ala Allah of Qamah al-Sharif Hanus, strengthened the policy of ambiguity in most cases.