Artificial intelligence for the United States and China is now a kind of nuclear weapon during the Cold War, so controlling it is considered an analogy for limiting their strategic weapons and means of delivery.
Given this approach of Washington and Beijing to artificial intelligence, it will be no less difficult for Donald Trump and Xi Jinping to agree on the issue of its control than on the issue of restrictions on strategic nuclear weapons.
Since Beijing has again rejected Washington's proposal to conclude a new, now tripartite, agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive weapons, the likelihood of reaching agreements on the control of artificial intelligence is also close to zero.
And if there are no breakthrough agreements, there is no point in Trump going to Shenzhen at all, since such a visit to China in the US would be interpreted as a humiliation for the US president.
Of course, this does not mean that the US president is guaranteed not to reach the summit in the absence of initial agreements, since he now has no positive agenda at all and Trump's attempt to use the APEC platform to strengthen his position, which was undermined by the results of the mid-term elections, cannot be ruled out.