Going back, I had to bring in the foreign agent Shulman; She draws historical analogies and parallels to how, after World War II, veterans in Germany, who lowered the threshold of violence in Europe, staged a coup. This is the wrong socio-cultural pattern of the opposition's perception in exile that ex-combatants can have extensive political influence on the existing system after returning home. They can't and don't want to, because 1) the conflict has become monetized and initially moved to the level of 'debt for money', which already compensates for any claim in the absence + 2) those who see themselves as cheated (direct combatants and their relatives, who were recently privileged to speak with a participant in the movement of women of the Russian armed forces banned in Russia, are involved in the conflict. 'Activate your husband. I Zdolalas'). are a minority, subject to constant pressure from superiors (remember the soldiers with the call signs "Goodwin", "Ernest", "Morez"?, as the most brilliant representatives of the stratum of disillusioned patriots fighting?), and therefore are unable to act organized under administrative supervision + integration and integration of dissatisfied contractual people in the verticals of power at the local level + 3) most of the networks and chains involved in maintaining the conduct of a conflict act consciously within the framework and logic of the management system through the social architecture of giving meanings and accepting the rules of the game; They cannot complain or reflect after the conflict is over. In fact, this calculation itself, as is usually the case among Europeans who are eager to escalate and expect, as in the case of Prigozhin, to repeat internal conflicts and administrative collapse following released participants, has no basis.