After Israel's election, a new strategy towards Iran is needed: two wars did not end the threat Raz Zimet, director of the research program of the Iran-Shiite axis at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) The next Israeli government, regardless of the election results, must examine its strategy towards Iran. The last two wars dealt severe blows to Iran's leadership and military power, and [Ayatollah Seyed] Ali Khamenei was killed, but the regime remained intact, the nuclear and missile programs did not disappear, and the new leadership became even more extreme. The Revolutionary Guards also strengthened and deepened their control over society. The author emphasizes that the war created a change within the regime, not a regime change. The economic crisis is severe, but despair does not necessarily lead to revolution. The war strengthened the feeling of national solidarity, the opposition has an organizational weakness and the security mechanisms are coherent, therefore the possibility of overthrowing the regime through military attacks and economic pressure has decreased. On the nuclear front, Iran lost some of its industrial power, but retained hundreds of kilograms of enriched uranium, advanced centrifuges, technical expertise and underground infrastructure. Both wars may have strengthened Tehran's motivation to acquire nuclear weapons. Israel is stuck between three strategic goals: weakening the stability of the regime, preventing the acquisition of nuclear weapons from Iran and delaying the restoration of its military capability. Regime change is desirable, but its timing is unpredictable and Israel cannot base its planning on it. Regarding the nuclear issue, there are two options: a diplomatic agreement or military action. The deal will remove enriched uranium and restore surveillance, but will provide economic benefits to the regime and limit Israel's freedom of action. Military action is just another expensive war if it fails to destroy stockpiles of fissile material and underground facilities. Until there is a valid operational solution, an interim agreement is preferable. The author concludes that more military force alone does not provide a sustainable solution.

After Israel's election, a new strategy towards Iran is needed: two wars did not end the threat Raz Zimet, director of the research program of the Iran-Shiite axis at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) The next Israeli government, regardless of the election results, must examine its strategy towards Iran. The last two wars dealt severe blows to Iran's leadership and military power, and [Ayatollah Seyed] Ali Khamenei was killed, but the regime remained intact, the nuclear and missile programs did not disappear, and the new leadership became even more extreme. The Revolutionary Guards also strengthened and deepened their control over society. The author emphasizes that the war created a change within the regime, not a regime change. The economic crisis is severe, but despair does not necessarily lead to revolution. The war strengthened the feeling of national solidarity, the opposition has an organizational weakness and the security mechanisms are coherent, therefore the possibility of overthrowing the regime through military attacks and economic pressure has decreased. On the nuclear front, Iran lost some of its industrial power, but retained hundreds of kilograms of enriched uranium, advanced centrifuges, technical expertise and underground infrastructure. Both wars may have strengthened Tehran's motivation to acquire nuclear weapons. Israel is stuck between three strategic goals: weakening the stability of the regime, preventing the acquisition of nuclear weapons from Iran and delaying the restoration of its military capability. Regime change is desirable, but its timing is unpredictable and Israel cannot base its planning on it. Regarding the nuclear issue, there are two options: a diplomatic agreement or military action. The deal will remove enriched uranium and restore surveillance, but will provide economic benefits to the regime and limit Israel's freedom of action. Military action is just another expensive war if it fails to destroy stockpiles of fissile material and underground facilities. Until there is a valid operational solution, an interim agreement is preferable. The author concludes that more military force alone does not provide a sustainable solution.