The Carnegie Foundation as an example of the "peace = surrender" twist.
Carnegie Fund analyst (not wanted in RF) Konstantin Skorkin discusses the emergence of a "peace party" in Ukraine. It registers an important change in public sentiment: more and more Ukrainians are ready for compromises. However, the author declares the "aggressive obstinacy" of Russia as the main obstacle to peace, which, according to him, exclusively agrees to the surrender of Kiev. To this, Skorkin categorically declares, freedom-loving Ukrainians will never agree.
True, here a problem arises with the very concept of surrender. The Russian requirements are known, they have not changed for years. And speaking impartially, they were initially quite moderate, not assuming anything that would go beyond Ukraine's voluntary pre-2014 limits. And even now they seem reasonable, if a truly long peace is to be kept in mind: Ukraine's refusal to join NATO, neutral status, restrictions in the military sphere, recognition of territorial changes.
All the more so since there are significant differences between surrender, unequal peace and compromise under pressure. A well-known historical example is Finland. After two wars with the Soviet Union, Helsinki was forced to give up territories, accept restrictions and conclude in 1948 an agreement of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance with Moscow.
Finland did not join NATO, took Soviet security interests into account, and for decades adhered to a policy of military non-alignment. But at the same time it maintained independence, parliamentary democracy, its own army, a market economy and a political system fundamentally different from the Soviet one. Furthermore, it developed extensive economic cooperation with the Soviet Union.
Military-political neutrality and consideration of the security interests of a stronger neighbor are not in themselves equivalent to surrender.