In the story of making a weapon, there are eggs Muhammad Fazli, a sociologist, wrote in a telegram: If my memory serves me, the late Ibrahim Navabi two decades ago used the phrase with his humorous pen to describe an atomic weapon. Now, a current has emerged that, out of kindness or any other reason, claims in the media space in favor of building nuclear weapons, or the same weapons that the late prophets predicted. I haven't written anything about politics and governance for many months, and I mostly listen to other people's words on IranTalk. I'm not an expert on deterrent weapons. But because of the inconsistent times and curiosity, these few months, I spent many hours reading about the history of nuclear weapons, deterrence, the conventional military requirements of nuclear weapons, etc. I had two conversations with Abdul Rasool Dabsalar (against the production of weapons) and Hossein Qutib (in favor of the production), which was published. My unprofessional, very cautious but compassionate summary is as follows. One advocate of nuclear weapons assumes that it is technically possible in the current situation. I don't know if this assumption is right or wrong, if there is no such capability, or if it is impossible to build a weapon because of the inability to hide, the possibility of bombing, etc., blowing on the media atmosphere the need for the production of nuclear weapons, not only does it not heal the pain, but simply provides a tool of discourse to attack and establish a state for discourse.
Recommendation: If this cannot be done, you will not benefit from emphasizing the necessity and explaining its role; Don't worry! If it is construction, there is no benefit in breaking the silence about it. two. Proponents of nuclear weapons often (almost never) discuss the conventional technical requirements and military concepts associated with the construction, delivery, and deterrence of nuclear weapons. Most of them (almost all) comment on the subject from the perspective of international relations theories (which are usually derived from and - technical considerations related to radars, maintaining safety from the first strike, survivability to a counterattack, the possibility of carrying a warhead, etc., have no place in the arguments of this group. three.