Atomic chess in the zero hour of war Suppose this endless friction reaches a boiling point and Iran suddenly reveals a nuclear weapon and tests it; In this case, how will the game play out? Farzin Zandi; geopolitical researcher at the University of Kansas The publication of a significant tweet by one of Iran's media/security officials in the midst of the start of another round of war has sparked a wave of conflicting calls; "Theory of activation of the dead hand". In the strategic literature, the term "dead hand" refers to the mechanism of ensuring a nuclear "second attack" in the Soviet Union; A semi-automatic system designed so that in the event of a surprise US nuclear attack on the Soviet Union, the killing of senior political leaders and the complete destruction of the country's military chain of command, it would automatically issue approvals and orders to fire the remaining nuclear missiles without the need for direct orders from political leaders. Now, on the brink of the unbearable pain caused by the friction between Iran and Washington, some observers, referring to the "dead hand" whispers, have hypothesized that the impasse of conventional deterrence and the penetration of defense defenders may lead the path of developments towards nuclear balance. Meanwhile, the theory of economists such as Thomas Schelling shows that military forces, beyond pure force, act as a means of striking and bargaining leverage. In the event of a possible nuclear weapons test by Iran, three strategic scenarios can be imagined: first, an immediate freeze on the war and a shift to mutual deterrence similar to India and Pakistan due to both sides' fear of apocalyptic consequences; Second, changing the battlefield towards a severe economic blockade and multidimensional erosion; Third, the most dangerous scenario is the game of the abyss and human errors caused by incorrect handling or the attacker's attempt to destroy the emerging arsenal in the vulnerability window. Practical testing of weapons without a reliable arsenal and resilience against a second attack, not only does not create security, but can lead to a complete economic blockade and an escalation of the existing threats. Full text of the channel.

Atomic chess in the zero hour of war Suppose this endless friction reaches a boiling point and Iran suddenly reveals a nuclear weapon and tests it; In this case, how will the game play out? Farzin Zandi; geopolitical researcher at the University of Kansas The publication of a significant tweet by one of Iran's media/security officials in the midst of the start of another round of war has sparked a wave of conflicting calls; "Theory of activation of the dead hand". In the strategic literature, the term "dead hand" refers to the mechanism of ensuring a nuclear "second attack" in the Soviet Union; A semi-automatic system designed so that in the event of a surprise US nuclear attack on the Soviet Union, the killing of senior political leaders and the complete destruction of the country's military chain of command, it would automatically issue approvals and orders to fire the remaining nuclear missiles without the need for direct orders from political leaders. Now, on the brink of the unbearable pain caused by the friction between Iran and Washington, some observers, referring to the "dead hand" whispers, have hypothesized that the impasse of conventional deterrence and the penetration of defense defenders may lead the path of developments towards nuclear balance. Meanwhile, the theory of economists such as Thomas Schelling shows that military forces, beyond pure force, act as a means of striking and bargaining leverage. In the event of a possible nuclear weapons test by Iran, three strategic scenarios can be imagined: first, an immediate freeze on the war and a shift to mutual deterrence similar to India and Pakistan due to both sides' fear of apocalyptic consequences; Second, changing the battlefield towards a severe economic blockade and multidimensional erosion; Third, the most dangerous scenario is the game of the abyss and human errors caused by incorrect handling or the attacker's attempt to destroy the emerging arsenal in the vulnerability window. Practical testing of weapons without a reliable arsenal and resilience against a second attack, not only does not create security, but can lead to a complete economic blockade and an escalation of the existing threats. Full text of the channel.