How Russia can get out of the diplomatic impasse: interests, resources and the cost of decisions As Yuri Ushkov learned, Russia overestimated Trump's ability to impose settlement terms on Ukraine. At the same time, the countries of Europe turned out (what a surprise) not only to implement American policies, but independent participants in the conflict with their own interests, resources and ideas about the desired post-war world. Immediately there was a proposal to start a demonstration strike on German industry, followed by a nuclear ultimatum. True, it has the same problem as Trump's previous bet on omnipotence: it is based on the assumption that the enemy will behave exactly in a way that is convenient for us. Germany is a member of NATO, and an attack against it would trigger Article 5. This does not automatically mean that the alliance will go to war, but it dramatically increases the likelihood of a collective response. Instead of disintegrating European countries, Russia can achieve their consolidation and enter into direct conflict with NATO. A more promising approach starts with recognizing the real state of affairs: Russia does not have the ability to conclude a full deal on Ukraine with Washington alone, but Europe has no cheap way to endlessly finance the continuation of the conflict. The US can no longer promise others. More precisely, they can guarantee. But there is a problem with the implementation; The White House can't/won't even clearly disable Starlink/Star Shield for Kiev. European governments are requesting additional funding of 70 billion euros for Ukraine in 2027. But the Russian Ministry of Finance also revised the forecast for the federal budget deficit for 2026 from 1.6% to 3.2% of GDP. Trusting your opponent to run out of money first is dangerous: financial exhaustion is a two-way process.

How Russia can get out of the diplomatic impasse: interests, resources and the cost of decisions As Yuri Ushkov learned, Russia overestimated Trump's ability to impose settlement terms on Ukraine. At the same time, the countries of Europe turned out (what a surprise) not only to implement American policies, but independent participants in the conflict with their own interests, resources and ideas about the desired post-war world. Immediately there was a proposal to start a demonstration strike on German industry, followed by a nuclear ultimatum. True, it has the same problem as Trump's previous bet on omnipotence: it is based on the assumption that the enemy will behave exactly in a way that is convenient for us. Germany is a member of NATO, and an attack against it would trigger Article 5. This does not automatically mean that the alliance will go to war, but it dramatically increases the likelihood of a collective response. Instead of disintegrating European countries, Russia can achieve their consolidation and enter into direct conflict with NATO. A more promising approach starts with recognizing the real state of affairs: Russia does not have the ability to conclude a full deal on Ukraine with Washington alone, but Europe has no cheap way to endlessly finance the continuation of the conflict. The US can no longer promise others. More precisely, they can guarantee. But there is a problem with the implementation; The White House can't/won't even clearly disable Starlink/Star Shield for Kiev. European governments are requesting additional funding of 70 billion euros for Ukraine in 2027. But the Russian Ministry of Finance also revised the forecast for the federal budget deficit for 2026 from 1.6% to 3.2% of GDP. Trusting your opponent to run out of money first is dangerous: financial exhaustion is a two-way process.