Three patterns have repeated themselves in this history: a partnership with the Yemeni forces to secure the road and share its costs, military movements from Egypt towards Yemen, the results of which were determined by geography and internal balances, and the concentration of the competing forces at the southern entrance, whose influence will spread to Egypt. The results of these patterns vary depending on the target, capacity and local partner. The corridor serves many factors, and its safety is directly related to the value of Egypt's location, its revenues from the canal and its strategic options. Therefore, cooperation with Yemen falls within the Egyptian interest, and its feasibility is measured by its ability to secure the road and achieve sustainable political goals. The current navigation crisis re-examines the relationship between coastal power and the use of the sea. In his March 2024 Proceedings magazine article, Kevin D. McRaney, Mahan and Corbett explain the value of lines of communication and the limits of naval power. The Houthis can compete with major powers for use of the road and use their resources to protect the ships, despite the group's inability to secure it themselves. Fleets can intercept attacks, escort ships and strike targets, while the persistence of the threat depends on the decision of the land force, its sources of supply and its relations. Therefore, the effectiveness of the naval operation depends on its connection to a broader strategy, and the nature and extent of the work on land remains subject to the objective, capabilities and circumstances. The limitations of naval power alone do not remove the need for a broad land campaign. Thomas Schelling explains how the ability to inflict damage becomes a means of extracting concessions, and Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye add that changing the cost of removing a resource or relationship gives leverage to the party less vulnerable to loss. This year's events support this logic. In August, the Houthis announced an expanded intention of Saudi oil tankers to the northern Red Sea, in response to Saudi Arabia moving its exports north. The group announced the targeting of energy facilities in Yanbu and Jizan, then hit a tanker about 63 nautical miles west of Yanbu, located about a thousand kilometers north of Yemen. According to press reports, Saudi Arabia transferred shipments from Yanbu to the Egyptian port of Ain Sokhna and then via a summary line to Sidi Kirir in the Mediterranean Sea. Thus, the alternative route that avoids Bab al-Mandab passes through Egyptian waters and ports.

Three patterns have repeated themselves in this history: a partnership with the Yemeni forces to secure the road and share its costs, military movements from Egypt towards Yemen, the results of which were determined by geography and internal balances, and the concentration of the competing forces at the southern entrance, whose influence will spread to Egypt. The results of these patterns vary depending on the target, capacity and local partner. The corridor serves many factors, and its safety is directly related to the value of Egypt's location, its revenues from the canal and its strategic options. Therefore, cooperation with Yemen falls within the Egyptian interest, and its feasibility is measured by its ability to secure the road and achieve sustainable political goals. The current navigation crisis re-examines the relationship between coastal power and the use of the sea. In his March 2024 Proceedings magazine article, Kevin D. McRaney, Mahan and Corbett explain the value of lines of communication and the limits of naval power. The Houthis can compete with major powers for use of the road and use their resources to protect the ships, despite the group's inability to secure it themselves. Fleets can intercept attacks, escort ships and strike targets, while the persistence of the threat depends on the decision of the land force, its sources of supply and its relations. Therefore, the effectiveness of the naval operation depends on its connection to a broader strategy, and the nature and extent of the work on land remains subject to the objective, capabilities and circumstances. The limitations of naval power alone do not remove the need for a broad land campaign. Thomas Schelling explains how the ability to inflict damage becomes a means of extracting concessions, and Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye add that changing the cost of removing a resource or relationship gives leverage to the party less vulnerable to loss. This year's events support this logic. In August, the Houthis announced an expanded intention of Saudi oil tankers to the northern Red Sea, in response to Saudi Arabia moving its exports north. The group announced the targeting of energy facilities in Yanbu and Jizan, then hit a tanker about 63 nautical miles west of Yanbu, located about a thousand kilometers north of Yemen. According to press reports, Saudi Arabia transferred shipments from Yanbu to the Egyptian port of Ain Sokhna and then via a summary line to Sidi Kirir in the Mediterranean Sea. Thus, the alternative route that avoids Bab al-Mandab passes through Egyptian waters and ports.