Egypt and Yemen national security along the Red Sea Super | D. Faisal Ali No one closed the Suez Canal in 2024. It remained open and ready to receive ships, yet its revenues dropped from about 10.25 billion dollars in 2023 to about 4 billion, because the danger that changed the calculations of the shipping companies arose more than two thousand kilometers to the south, at the entrance to the Red Sea. In this gap between the position of the channel and the position of danger lies the essence of the current Egyptian debate about support for Saudi Arabia. The announcement by Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi about Egypt's willingness to support Saudi Arabia's defense capabilities, and the National Defense Council's decision to provide the necessary and possible forms of support to the kingdom, reopened the debate on military participation and its risks. The Egyptian president defined the proposed mission as a defense of the kingdom, and denied his intention to attack Yemen. However, putting the issue this way requires a distinction between Yemen and the Houthi group. Saudi Arabia supports the internationally recognized government of Yemen against an armed group that has turned against it, and that the Yemeni and US authorities have classified as a terrorist organization. Reducing this conflict to a conflict between Saudi Arabia and Yemen gives the Houthis the status of representing the country whose institutions they seized, and serves their narrative of a foreign war aimed at it. Voices of Egypt mentioned the attempt of the 1960s to warn against a return to Yemen, as if the Egyptian intervention at that time was considered a failure. Egypt bore a heavy price, and its support contributed to the defense of the nascent republic, which remained after the withdrawal of its forces, and to the construction of administrative institutions, education, training and services. This is a result that prevents the attempt to reduce to exhaustion, while the responsibility of the Yemen war for the defeat of June 1967 should prove its causal links and weigh it among the causes of the defeat. Egypt today moves in a context where its interests intersect with Saudi Arabia and the state of Yemen. Saudi Arabia's security and navigation order are related to Egypt's resources, ports and the value of its location, and the cooperation with the two countries gives it the ability to deal with danger wherever it arises, and to participate in the post-conflict arrangements. These interests have a long history, and the tools to secure them have changed with changes in power, technologies and balances of influence. From the Gulf of Aden ships enter Bab al-Mandab, then ascend the Red Sea along Yemen and Saudi Arabia to the east, and the Horn of Africa, Sudan and Egypt to the west, before the sea branches north towards Suez and Aqaba.

Egypt and Yemen national security along the Red Sea Super | D. Faisal Ali No one closed the Suez Canal in 2024. It remained open and ready to receive ships, yet its revenues dropped from about 10.25 billion dollars in 2023 to about 4 billion, because the danger that changed the calculations of the shipping companies arose more than two thousand kilometers to the south, at the entrance to the Red Sea. In this gap between the position of the channel and the position of danger lies the essence of the current Egyptian debate about support for Saudi Arabia. The announcement by Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi about Egypt's willingness to support Saudi Arabia's defense capabilities, and the National Defense Council's decision to provide the necessary and possible forms of support to the kingdom, reopened the debate on military participation and its risks. The Egyptian president defined the proposed mission as a defense of the kingdom, and denied his intention to attack Yemen. However, putting the issue this way requires a distinction between Yemen and the Houthi group. Saudi Arabia supports the internationally recognized government of Yemen against an armed group that has turned against it, and that the Yemeni and US authorities have classified as a terrorist organization. Reducing this conflict to a conflict between Saudi Arabia and Yemen gives the Houthis the status of representing the country whose institutions they seized, and serves their narrative of a foreign war aimed at it. Voices of Egypt mentioned the attempt of the 1960s to warn against a return to Yemen, as if the Egyptian intervention at that time was considered a failure. Egypt bore a heavy price, and its support contributed to the defense of the nascent republic, which remained after the withdrawal of its forces, and to the construction of administrative institutions, education, training and services. This is a result that prevents the attempt to reduce to exhaustion, while the responsibility of the Yemen war for the defeat of June 1967 should prove its causal links and weigh it among the causes of the defeat. Egypt today moves in a context where its interests intersect with Saudi Arabia and the state of Yemen. Saudi Arabia's security and navigation order are related to Egypt's resources, ports and the value of its location, and the cooperation with the two countries gives it the ability to deal with danger wherever it arises, and to participate in the post-conflict arrangements. These interests have a long history, and the tools to secure them have changed with changes in power, technologies and balances of influence. From the Gulf of Aden ships enter Bab al-Mandab, then ascend the Red Sea along Yemen and Saudi Arabia to the east, and the Horn of Africa, Sudan and Egypt to the west, before the sea branches north towards Suez and Aqaba.