Former Shin Bet chief Bar in the prosecution article details how a warning was sent at 3:03 a.m. on October 7, hours before the massacre, Bar emphasizes that even the Shin Bet did not assess that night that "Hamas was facing an all-out attack," but contradicts the Prime Minister's claims that Bar decided not to call and wake him up

Former Shin Bet chief Bar in the prosecution article details how a warning was sent at 3:03 a.m. on October 7, hours before the massacre, Bar emphasizes that even the Shin Bet did not assess that night that "Hamas was facing an all-out attack," but contradicts the Prime Minister's claims that Bar decided not to call and wake him up

Bar specifies that at the conclusion of the nightly discussion it was decided to call and inform the then military secretary Avi Gil, and this was done, and that the decision whether or not to wake the prime minister rests with the military secretariat

Avi Gil, according to the indictment, was updated on the intelligence situation at 3:55 at the latest.