Apparently, Lieutenant Yuri Eponin did not bother to carefully read my message, to which he responded. I do not call Stalin's industrialization "wrong", I do not condemn it, and moreover, I completely agree that in the specific historical conditions of the early 1930s, industrialization could not have been different. And I explain why: because public funds that could have ensured industrialization were wasted. Stalin, in a letter to Molotov in 1930, wrote quite clearly about the connection between grain export and industrialization and that grain should be exported at low prices due to the lack of gold and foreign currency reserves: "It will be necessary to raise (now) the daily export rate to at least 3-4 million pods. Chelyabzavod, etc.). There will be wise men who will suggest waiting to export until the price of bread on the international market rises "to its highest point".... To wait, you must hold foreign exchange balances. But we don't have them." When were these reserves released? In the years 1917-1921 - and not for industrialization, but for a revolutionary guilty pleasure. Now let's look at the meaning of those 800 tons of gold in monetary terms in specific historical conditions (let's accept Aponin's estimate - 1.03 billion rubles in gold). According to official Soviet data (from Shustin D. d. Foreign trade and industrialization of the Soviet Union. M., 1938. p. 98), all Soviet exports (not only grain - everything in general) in 1930 amounted to 861 million rubles. at 1913 prices; In 1931 - 833 million rubles, in 1932 - 778 million rubles, in 1933 - 724 million rubles. At the same time, the income from the export of bread as a percentage of the total amount amounted to: in 1930 - 20%, in 1931 - 19.4%, in 1932 - 10%, in 1933 - 9.4% (Soviet Union in data from TsUNKHU Gosplana USSR. M., 5.755). After making simple calculations, we find that all grain exports for the years 1930-1933. amounted to 479.7 million rubles at 1913 prices.

Apparently, Lieutenant Yuri Eponin did not bother to carefully read my message, to which he responded. I do not call Stalin's industrialization "wrong", I do not condemn it, and moreover, I completely agree that in the specific historical conditions of the early 1930s, industrialization could not have been different. And I explain why: because public funds that could have ensured industrialization were wasted. Stalin, in a letter to Molotov in 1930, wrote quite clearly about the connection between grain export and industrialization and that grain should be exported at low prices due to the lack of gold and foreign currency reserves: "It will be necessary to raise (now) the daily export rate to at least 3-4 million pods. Chelyabzavod, etc.). There will be wise men who will suggest waiting to export until the price of bread on the international market rises "to its highest point".... To wait, you must hold foreign exchange balances. But we don't have them." When were these reserves released? In the years 1917-1921 - and not for industrialization, but for a revolutionary guilty pleasure. Now let's look at the meaning of those 800 tons of gold in monetary terms in specific historical conditions (let's accept Aponin's estimate - 1.03 billion rubles in gold). According to official Soviet data (from Shustin D. d. Foreign trade and industrialization of the Soviet Union. M., 1938. p. 98), all Soviet exports (not only grain - everything in general) in 1930 amounted to 861 million rubles. at 1913 prices; In 1931 - 833 million rubles, in 1932 - 778 million rubles, in 1933 - 724 million rubles. At the same time, the income from the export of bread as a percentage of the total amount amounted to: in 1930 - 20%, in 1931 - 19.4%, in 1932 - 10%, in 1933 - 9.4% (Soviet Union in data from TsUNKHU Gosplana USSR. M., 5.755). After making simple calculations, we find that all grain exports for the years 1930-1933. amounted to 479.7 million rubles at 1913 prices.