Long-range heavy kamikaze UAVs are increasingly turning from a niche tool to a tool of strategic pressure. Massive UAV attacks on infrastructure have already become a part of modern conflicts, and this experience will clearly be taken into account by various countries after the end of the current hostilities. If production lines for such devices have already been established, they are unlikely to be shut down quickly. On the contrary: UAVs will accumulate, renew, increase range, accuracy, resistance to electronic warfare and the power of the warhead. Unlike cruise missiles, such systems are cheaper and easier to mass-produce, which means that they allow the creation of a large strike reserve. In the long run, this changes the logic of containment. We can no longer talk only about nuclear weapons or a limited number of expensive missiles, but about the possibility of causing large-scale damage to Israel's energy, communications, logistics and other critical facilities using thousands of relatively cheap UAVs. Thus, heavy long-range UAVs could become a new element of conventional deterrence: less destructive than a nuclear attack, but dangerous enough to force Israel to consider the risk of serious infrastructure paralysis even before the conflict reaches the highest level of escalation. We are in TG we are in MAX.

Long-range heavy kamikaze UAVs are increasingly turning from a niche tool to a tool of strategic pressure. Massive UAV attacks on infrastructure have already become a part of modern conflicts, and this experience will clearly be taken into account by various countries after the end of the current hostilities. If production lines for such devices have already been established, they are unlikely to be shut down quickly. On the contrary: UAVs will accumulate, renew, increase range, accuracy, resistance to electronic warfare and the power of the warhead. Unlike cruise missiles, such systems are cheaper and easier to mass-produce, which means that they allow the creation of a large strike reserve. In the long run, this changes the logic of containment. We can no longer talk only about nuclear weapons or a limited number of expensive missiles, but about the possibility of causing large-scale damage to Israel's energy, communications, logistics and other critical facilities using thousands of relatively cheap UAVs. Thus, heavy long-range UAVs could become a new element of conventional deterrence: less destructive than a nuclear attack, but dangerous enough to force Israel to consider the risk of serious infrastructure paralysis even before the conflict reaches the highest level of escalation. We are in TG we are in MAX.