The US has little riding on Israel's election results - here's why Israelis voted in an election billed as a referendum on Benjamin Netanyahu, but whatever the outcome, the country's relationship with Washington will not change significantly. The reason is simple: on the issues most important to the United States -. A Palestinian state, Iran and the wider use of military force -. Netanyahu's main challenger, former army chief Gadi Eisenkot, occupies almost identical ground. Eisenkot explicitly rejected the two-state solution, calling it a "mistake", and pledged to destroy or dismantle the military arm of Hamas, just as Netanyahu did. Almost every party with a Jewish majority in Israel now opposes the establishment of a Palestinian state, meaning that any new government will be limited from making wholesale policy changes of the kind that would register with American public opinion. The same dynamic applies to Iran. Netanyahu spent the campaign hinting that he is ready for another round of strikes against Tehran alongside President Trump, and there is no indication that Eisenkot will reduce Israel's confrontation with Iran. If anything, the strategic assumptions underlying Israeli policy - breaking Iran, holding buffer zones beyond Israel's borders and prioritizing military power - have hardened since October 7, 2023, and are widely shared by the entire security establishment and political class. A new prime minister will inherit the same tough choices about how to respond to Tehran's preparations to resume hostilities, with no clear mandate to pursue a dramatically different course. The real gap in Israeli politics is one of degrees and not of direction: with how aggressively to prosecute wars, to what extent to expand the settlements, and whether to strive for diplomacy at all.

The US has little riding on Israel's election results - here's why Israelis voted in an election billed as a referendum on Benjamin Netanyahu, but whatever the outcome, the country's relationship with Washington will not change significantly. The reason is simple: on the issues most important to the United States -. A Palestinian state, Iran and the wider use of military force -. Netanyahu's main challenger, former army chief Gadi Eisenkot, occupies almost identical ground. Eisenkot explicitly rejected the two-state solution, calling it a "mistake", and pledged to destroy or dismantle the military arm of Hamas, just as Netanyahu did. Almost every party with a Jewish majority in Israel now opposes the establishment of a Palestinian state, meaning that any new government will be limited from making wholesale policy changes of the kind that would register with American public opinion. The same dynamic applies to Iran. Netanyahu spent the campaign hinting that he is ready for another round of strikes against Tehran alongside President Trump, and there is no indication that Eisenkot will reduce Israel's confrontation with Iran. If anything, the strategic assumptions underlying Israeli policy - breaking Iran, holding buffer zones beyond Israel's borders and prioritizing military power - have hardened since October 7, 2023, and are widely shared by the entire security establishment and political class. A new prime minister will inherit the same tough choices about how to respond to Tehran's preparations to resume hostilities, with no clear mandate to pursue a dramatically different course. The real gap in Israeli politics is one of degrees and not of direction: with how aggressively to prosecute wars, to what extent to expand the settlements, and whether to strive for diplomacy at all.