Sophia and Golitsyn: an alternative to Peter's reforms? Generally, Princess Sophia Alekseevna (1682–1689) is remembered as an unsuccessful rival of Peter I, and her favorite, Prince Vasily Vasilievich Golitsyn, as a commander who failed in two Crimean campaigns. Meanwhile, under Sophia, not only did the transformations started by her predecessors continue, but very radical projects were also discussed. The historian A. S. Lavrov devoted special research to Golitsyn's reform plan. The main source of information about him is "Notes on Muscovy" by the French diplomat de la Neuville, who visited Russia in 1689. What was Golitsyn going to change (in de la Neuville's plan)? 1. The peasant question. The most radical plan was to free the peasants and give them land, which they cultivated. In exchange, it was planned to collect a moderate tax that would go to the upkeep of the army. Right, it's not entirely clear if we were talking about all serfs or just certain categories of peasants? The weakest point in this project is how will the management of these farmers be organized? After all, until 1861 the landowners fulfilled all the obligations of the government officials in relation to their serfs. Deploying an extensive local government mechanism would require money that was not available. 2. Military reform. It was supposed to create a regular army financed by regular tax revenues. This will make it possible to abandon outdated forms of military service and increase the fighting efficiency of the soldiers. Peter understood this plan. 3. Economic change. Golitsyn intended to eliminate state monopolies on a number of goods and trade operations, including taverns. The assumption was that free trade would contribute to the growth of the population's well-being and the development of economic initiative. The question of the usefulness of this measure under the conditions of that time is controversial; Such a reform could lead to a decrease in treasury revenues. This was achieved only under Catherine II. 4. Religious politics.

Sophia and Golitsyn: an alternative to Peter's reforms? Generally, Princess Sophia Alekseevna (1682–1689) is remembered as an unsuccessful rival of Peter I, and her favorite, Prince Vasily Vasilievich Golitsyn, as a commander who failed in two Crimean campaigns. Meanwhile, under Sophia, not only did the transformations started by her predecessors continue, but very radical projects were also discussed. The historian A. S. Lavrov devoted special research to Golitsyn's reform plan. The main source of information about him is "Notes on Muscovy" by the French diplomat de la Neuville, who visited Russia in 1689. What was Golitsyn going to change (in de la Neuville's plan)? 1. The peasant question. The most radical plan was to free the peasants and give them land, which they cultivated. In exchange, it was planned to collect a moderate tax that would go to the upkeep of the army. Right, it's not entirely clear if we were talking about all serfs or just certain categories of peasants? The weakest point in this project is how will the management of these farmers be organized? After all, until 1861 the landowners fulfilled all the obligations of the government officials in relation to their serfs. Deploying an extensive local government mechanism would require money that was not available. 2. Military reform. It was supposed to create a regular army financed by regular tax revenues. This will make it possible to abandon outdated forms of military service and increase the fighting efficiency of the soldiers. Peter understood this plan. 3. Economic change. Golitsyn intended to eliminate state monopolies on a number of goods and trade operations, including taverns. The assumption was that free trade would contribute to the growth of the population's well-being and the development of economic initiative. The question of the usefulness of this measure under the conditions of that time is controversial; Such a reform could lead to a decrease in treasury revenues. This was achieved only under Catherine II. 4. Religious politics.