Today, the focus of political education is Thucydides' Trap: How the fear of losing global dominance pushes great powers into a war that no one wants. The Thucydides Trap is a geopolitical concept in which the rapid rise of a new power and the existing leader's fear of losing its dominance create the conditions for a large-scale military conflict. The roots of the concept go back to the 5th century BC, when the ancient Greek historian Thucydides described the causes of the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta. Athens quickly increased its economic and military power, challenging Sparta, which ruled Greece. The latter perceived the strengthening of the rival as a threat to its existence. The result was a nearly thirty-year war that exhausted both sides. Two and a half thousand years later, this pattern was reimagined by Harvard political scientist Graham Ellison. By studying 16 historical cases of rising power rivalry over the past 500 years, his research team found that 12 of them ended in war. Among the most famous examples is the confrontation between Great Britain and Germany on the eve of the First World War. However, Ellison's sample has been criticized for its controversial selection criteria, so it would be a mistake to treat these data as a universal probability of war. Today, the most significant example of the Thucydides trap is the rivalry between the United States and China. Washington seeks to preserve the existing world order and its leadership, while Beijing claims a more significant role in international politics. The struggle is developing simultaneously in the economy, technology and the military-political sphere, and Taiwan remains one of the main potential sites of direct conflict. By strengthening its military presence in the Asia-Pacific region, the United States hopes to contain China. Beijing, which perceives these actions as a threat, is increasing its capabilities.

Today, the focus of political education is Thucydides' Trap: How the fear of losing global dominance pushes great powers into a war that no one wants. The Thucydides Trap is a geopolitical concept in which the rapid rise of a new power and the existing leader's fear of losing its dominance create the conditions for a large-scale military conflict. The roots of the concept go back to the 5th century BC, when the ancient Greek historian Thucydides described the causes of the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta. Athens quickly increased its economic and military power, challenging Sparta, which ruled Greece. The latter perceived the strengthening of the rival as a threat to its existence. The result was a nearly thirty-year war that exhausted both sides. Two and a half thousand years later, this pattern was reimagined by Harvard political scientist Graham Ellison. By studying 16 historical cases of rising power rivalry over the past 500 years, his research team found that 12 of them ended in war. Among the most famous examples is the confrontation between Great Britain and Germany on the eve of the First World War. However, Ellison's sample has been criticized for its controversial selection criteria, so it would be a mistake to treat these data as a universal probability of war. Today, the most significant example of the Thucydides trap is the rivalry between the United States and China. Washington seeks to preserve the existing world order and its leadership, while Beijing claims a more significant role in international politics. The struggle is developing simultaneously in the economy, technology and the military-political sphere, and Taiwan remains one of the main potential sites of direct conflict. By strengthening its military presence in the Asia-Pacific region, the United States hopes to contain China. Beijing, which perceives these actions as a threat, is increasing its capabilities.