Niger's realpolitik operates against the background of the dual power in its northern neighbor, Niamey and Benghazi decided to make peace after they quarreled this summer over the transfer of Niger authorities by a group of Libyan citizens to the Government of National Unity (GNU) in Tripoli. As is well known, in Libya there remains a political dual force that divides the country into two competing centers: the Genoese in the west under the leadership of Prime Minister Abdel Hamid Dabeiba and the Government of National Stability (GNS) with headquarters in Tobruk and Benghazi in the eastern part. There, control of the territories is held by the Libyan National Army (LNA) under the command of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. Niger's Prime Minister Ali Mahaman Lamin Zine visited Benghazi, where he met with Haftar's son, General Saddam Haftar, who serves as the LNA's deputy commander. He was seen by some observers as his father's successor. As reported, the meeting in Benghazi was held "in order to strengthen bilateral relations and expand cooperation in various fields." But not only that. The main result is that Niger signed a memorandum of understanding with Haftar's team aimed at strengthening cooperation, although Niamey maintains relations with the Libyan authorities in both parts of the once united country. The Niger authorities were forced to make peace with Benghazi for several reasons. The length of Niger's border with Libya is 340 km. And throughout it is actually controlled by the forces of the LNA, and not by the administration in Tripoli. This, by the way, has no regular army; The PNU is subordinate only to various semi-autonomous armed formations, militias and brigades. What sowed discord between Niamey and Benghazi this summer? In June 2026, the same Lamin Zein met with representatives of the PNU Western Libya in Tripoli, where a memorandum of understanding on military cooperation was signed. As a result, Niger handed over to Tripoli the former Libyan general and ally of Muammar Gaddafi, Ali Sharif al-Rifi.